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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-26 (2) (a) (1953 as 
amended), and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f), 
whereby a defendant in a District Court criminal action 
may take an appeal from a final judgment and conviction of 
any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
iii 
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Section 76-5-304 Utah Code Ann. (I^DJ \ I- i , ] 
Section 0-5-102 Utah Code Ann, (1953 as amended) 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
76-5-102: Assault is: (b) A threat, accompanied by a 
show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another. 
76-5-103: Aggravated Assault.- (1) A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as 
defined in section 76-5-102 and: (b) He 
uses a deadly weapon or such means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury. 
76-5-304: Unlawful Detention.- (" " person commits 
unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains 
another unlawfully so as to interfere 
substantially with his liberty. 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was counsel ineffective in representing 
defendant by not having defendant testify and in not 
calling a potentially helpful witness? 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the 
conviction, or was it inherently improbable so that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
of defendant's guilt? 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER GRAY 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction 
against Christopher Gray, for Aggravated Assam* : M irl 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Cod<=> Anno! a! <jii >(tion 
7b-'j-lUJ \ [{VJ1 as amended), and Unlawful Detention, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah rode Annotated 
76-5-304 (±ybj c:--> • • . y 1 ound Hi , Gray guilty 
of both charges on September 15, 1989, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt. Lake county, 
State of i^ -ah, H-i^  H<MVM ^ h 11* John A Pokich, Judge, 
presiding. Judge Rokich rendered the final judgment and 
conviction on November l, 1989, and sentenced Mr, Gray to 
zero to five year.s in in J 'im .tnd ,\i\ imoutlis In the Salt 
Lake County jail, terms to run consecutively. 
Case no. 890706-CA 
Category no. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 11, 1989, defendant, a registered 
guest at the Quality Inn, went to the front desk 
requesting their shuttle service. He left his luggage in 
his room. He was directed to speak with a Kathy Merrill, 
a former police officer now employed as a security guard 
and shuttle driver for the Inn. (T.68) After a brief 
discussion defendant and Ms. Merrill left in a van. 
(T.72). 
At trial, Ms. Merrill testified that she had 
agreed to take defendant as far as Redwood Road and North 
Temple (T.70). She further testified that while en route, 
defendant displayed a holstered handgun (T.75) and 
directed that he be taken to an area near 4500 South and 
700 East (T.76). She testified that, at some point en 
route, defendant placed the holstered gun on her lap 
(T.79) and then placed it on the dashboard (T.80). She 
testified that defendant had her stop at a gas station 
where he exited the van, went inside and purchased beer 
(T.92), then returned and Ms. Merrill resumed en route. 
She testified that defendant gave her ten dollars and left 
most of the beer in the van (T.95). 
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After dropping defendant off at his desired 
destination, M s . Merrill called in to the front desk, then 
returned to the Ir 1 n, and the 1 1 t he po 1 1ce were ca1led 
( T . 9 6 ) . Defendant was arrested at the address where Ms, 
Merrill dropped him off and charged as noted above. From 
that evidence and those convictions defendant now appeals, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims his appointed counsel was 
ineffective in his representation when he failed to 
c o u n t e r the e v i :3 e n c e a g a i i I s t the d e f e n d a n t c o i I s :ii s t :i n g 
largely of the testimony of Ms. Merrill, by failing to 
call defendant *o testify on his owii behalf. No motions 
w e r e f i l e a •- : f o r d e f e n d a n t t o t e s t i f y, a n < 3 
defendant contends that only his testimony would have 
served to counter and address the damaging testimony given 
by Ms Merri ] 1. 
Defendant claims counsel failed to call a 
potentially helpful witness, another shuttle driver who, 
def endant prof f ers , wou 1 d have helped cast doubt on Ms. 
Merrill's credibility. 
Defendant further claims the evidence given by 
Ms. Merrill was inherently improbable and so inconclusive 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt of defendant's gi Ii 1 t , 
- 3 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN HIS 
REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT 
The right to effective assistance of counsel is 
well settled (Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)) and that issue was 
addressed by this court in State v. Pursifell, 746 P2d 270 
(Ut. App. 1987). To prevail, the defendant must 
demonstrate, first, that counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. 
Here, the most damaging testimony against the 
defendant came from Kathy Merrill, who testified to being 
alone with, coerced, terrified, detained and assaulted by 
the defendant, aggravated by the presence of the holstered 
weapon. The only other witness who could relate and 
explain critical facts to the jury was the defendant. 
Defendant claims his counsel failed to communicate his 
trial strategy with him, and failed to take the 
appropriate measures necessary to have defendant testify 
as defendant expected he would be doing. 
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Defendant also claims his counsel failed to 
investigate and call to the stand a helpful witness who 
may have helped cast doubt on some of Ms. Merrill's 
testimony. The anticipated testimony from this witness 
would have served to attack Ms. Merrill's credibility by 
supporting defendant's contention that he had not forced 
her to drive him, but that she had agreed and it was not 
contrary to the Inn's policy to do so. Defendant's point 
being that not enough was done by counsel to attack Ms. 
Merrill's credibility in support of, and in corroboration 
of what defendant's expected testimony would have been. 
Defendant claims counsel failed to file the 
appropriate motions with the court to protect defendant's 
credibility when he took the stand. For example, since 
defendant had no prior convictions that would 
'automatically' be admissible against him under Rule 609, 
his convictions would require a balancing test under the 
rule which counsel failed to ask the trial court to rule 
on. 
Defendant contends his counsel's judgment fell 
below objective reasonable professional standards when he 
failed to anticipate and reckon the need for defendant's 
testimony and take the appropriate measures, such as 
filing those Rule 609 motions, interviewing the potential 
- 5 -
witness, and preparing defendant for the witness stand. 
Defendant does not imply that he is 
second-guessing counsel's strategy, rather he is alleging 
that counsel failed to keep him informed regarding his 
case, as well as failed to share the case strategy with 
him. 
Defendant contends his case was prejudiced by 
counsel's ineffectiveness and submits as a further 
indication of this the fact that the jury requested more 
information about defendant and the gun during 
deliberations (T.270). Defendant contends that his 
testimony regarding the situation in the van, his 
testimony regarding showing Ms. Merrill the gun, coupled 
with corroborating evidence and the incredulous testimony 
that Ms. Merrill gave (T.155-156), would have in all 
likelihood led to a more favorable result for defendant. 
Defendant doubts whether a 'cautionary' 
instruction to the effect that defendant's right not to 
testify should not be held against him would prevent a 
jury from concluding defendant must he hiding something or 
he would testify. Here, defendant contends he intended to 
testify and only counsel's ineffectiveness prevented him 
from presenting himself as well as his entire defense 
before the jury. 
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POINT II 
THE TESTIMONY OF KATHY MERRILL WAS SO 
INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE AND INCONCLUSIVE 
THAT REASONABLE MINDS WOULD ENTERTAIN A 
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated status of 
the law regarding sufficiency of evidence many times and 
states in State v. Kerekes, 611 P2d 1161, 1168, that it is 
the defendant's burden to establish that the evidence was 
so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime charged. [This] court will 
examine the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury. 
Defendant contends that Ms. Merrill's testimony 
was improbable and incredible and that reasonable minds 
must entertain a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Her 
testimony, though uncontroverted due to the issue raised 
in Point 1 is highly improbable. For example, she 
testified that defendant left the vehicle, went inside a 
store, retrieved and purchased beer; and though she was 
unclear whether he left the gun on the dash or not, and 
even though she sat behind the wheel with the engine 
running, she made no effort to escape, claiming she was 
- 7 -
frozen with fear; even though she had been an experienced 
police officer. No effort to escape her threat and 
detention rings of the incredulous, when all she need do 
is step on the gas. It could just as easily speak to the 
lack of a threat as to an omnipresent threat, and no 
threat means no assault and no unlawful detention. 
The jury by wanting more information during 
deliberations, revealed that questions were present 
regarding the presence or absence of a threat and the 
sufficiency of the evidence. 
Defendant contends the jury ultimately and 
unreasonably erred on the side of 'just in case1 and 
decided to convict. Defendant's active participation in 
trial may well have countered that fear while addressing 
first hand, the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant, 
Christopher Gray, requests that this court reverse his 
conviction of Aggravated Assault and Unlawful Detention 
and remand his case to the trial court for a new trial or 
dismissal of the charges. 
Respectfully Submitted this f day of 
&tf__, 1990. M 
MANNY GARCIA1 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 8 -
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, MANNY GARCIA, hereby certify that eight copies 
of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of 
appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114 this l day of May, 1990. 
-^flANNY GARC 
DELIVERED by 
this day of May, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
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a result of plaintiffs' efforts. These find-
ings will support the court's conclusion as 
to whether defendant Lund is liable to 
plaintiffs under quantum meruit—a con-
tract implied in law, or quantum meruit 
—a contract implied in fact, or neither. As 
is explained more fully supra, the measure 
of damages may differ depending on the 
theory adopted. 
V. INTEREST 
In awarding damages, the applicable le-
gal rate of interest must also be deter-
mined. The 1981 amendment to section 
15-1-1 increased the legal rate of interest 
from 6 percent to 10 percent. Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986). 
[12] The statutory legal rate of interest 
is applied from the date payment is due to 
the judgment date. See Lignell v. Berg, 
593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979). 
[13] The trial court found July 7, 1981, 
the date defendant Lund signed the settle-
ment statement, as the due date, as that 
was the date the benefit was conferred. It 
was also on this date that defendants ac-
knowledged an obligation to pay plaintiffs 
for their services in constructing the du-
plexes. We find that this determination is 
supported by substantial evidence and 
therefore will not disturb it on appeal. See 
id at 810. Based on this factual determi-
nation, we find the appropriate rate of in-
terest is 10 percent 
The May 17, 1985 judgment is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part The case is 
remanded for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. Each party to bear 
its own costs. 
GARFF, and ORME, JJ., concur. 
f o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
v. 
Rick PURSIFELL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860361-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 2, 1987. 
Defendant was convicted by jury in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J. 
Dennis Frederick, J., of burglary, attempt-
ed burglary, theft, and vehicle burglary, 
and defendant appealed, alleging he was 
denied Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel. The Court of Ap-
peals, Orme, J., held that: (1) trial court's 
inquiry into defendant's expression Qf dis-
satisfaction with court-appointed counsel 
was sufficient; (2) defendant's complaints 
did not warrant substitution of counsel; 
and (3) defendant failed to sustain burden 
of proving ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>64U0(2) 
Indigent defendant has constitutional 
right to appointed counsel, but has no con-
stitutional right to lawyer other than one 
appointed, absent good cause. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
2. Criminal Law e»641.10(2), 1152(1) 
Whether to appoint different lawyer 
for indigent defendant who expresses dis-
satisfaction with court-appointed counsel, 
but has no constitutional right to appoint-
ment of different lawyer, is matter commit-
ted to sound discretion of trial court and 
will be reversed only for abuse of discre-
tion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
3. Criminal Law e»641.10(2) 
Upon indigent defendant's complaint 
concerning court-appointed counsel, court 
must balance potential for last minute de-
lay and propensity for manipulation of sys-
tem against competing concern about likely 
STATE v. PURSIFELL 
Cite as 746 PJtd 270 (UtahApp. 1987) 
Utah 271 
inability of defendant to articulate and 
communicate dissatisfaction in setting that 
most laypersons find quite intimidating. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
4. Criminal Law <3=>641.7(1) 
Trial court has no duty to routinely 
initiate its own inquiry as to whether indi-
gent defendant is satisfied with court-ap-
pointed counsel. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
5. Criminal Law <3=>641.10(2) 
Upon indigent defendant's expression 
of dissatisfaction with court-appointed 
counsel, even if trial court suspects that 
defendant's requests are disingenuous and 
designed solely to manipulate judicial pro-
cess and to delay trial, trial court must 
make some reasonable, nonsuggestive ef-
fort to determine nature of defendant's 
complaints and to apprise itself of facts 
necessary to determine whether defend-
ant's relationship with appointed attorney 
has deteriorated to point that sound discre-
tion requires substitution or even to such 
extent that defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel would be violated but for 
substitution. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
6. Criminal Law e=>1166.11(5) 
Upon indigent defendant's expression 
of dissatisfaction with appointed counsel's 
representation, trial court's response in di-
recting follow-up questions to discovery 
matter mentioned by defendant, without 
inquiring further into concern alluded to by 
defendant as to counsel's pretrial prepara-
tion, was not reversible error; defendant 
had placed emphasis on his concern about 
discovery matter and lack of more than one 
face-to-face meeting with defense counsel 
prior to trial was not necessarily insuffi-
cient preparation in routine criminal case. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
7. Criminal Law e=>641.10(2) 
Substitute counsel must be appointed 
for indigent defendant upon showing of 
good cause, such as conflict of interest, 
complete breakdown of communication, or 
irreconcilable conflict with attorney. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
^tr-8. Criminal Law <s»641.10(3) 
Forcing indigent defendant to stand 
trial with assistance of attorney with whom 
he has become embroiled in irreconcilable 
conflict violates defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
9. Criminal Law <3=>641.10(2) 
Failure of appointed counsel to notify 
defendant that counsel had filed routine 
discovery motion until after stipulation had 
been entered was not so disadvantageous 
as to rise to Sixth Amendment violation 
mandating substitution of appointed coun-
sel, even if motion was subjectively impor-
tant to defendant; routine discovery mo-
tion required no input from defendant 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
10. Criminal Law <3=>641.13(1) 
Serious lack of preparation might, in 
some circumstances, rise to violation of de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive representation. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 6. 
11. Criminal Law <s=»641.10(2) 
Appointed counsel's failure to have 
more than one meeting with defendant pri-
or to trial did not warrant substitution of 
appointed counsel under Sixth Amendment, 
considering fairly routine nature of under-
lying facts and offenses charged and ap-
pointed counsel's experience. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
12. Criminal Law <8=>641.10(2) 
Denial of motion for substitution of 
court-appointed counsel may be abuse of 
trial court's discretion, even though defend-
ant's complaints are not of constitutional 
magnitude. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
13. Criminal Law <3=>641.10(2) 
Denial of indigent defendant's motion 
for substitution of court-appointed counsel, 
alleging failure to timely inform defendant 
of discovery motion and inadequate prepa-
ration, was not abuse of trial court's discre-
tion. 
14. Criminal Law e»641.13(l) 
To prove ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show that specific, 
272 Utah 746 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
identified acts or omissions fell outside 
wide range of professionally competent as-
sistance and that defendant was prejudiced 
as result of alleged deficiencies. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
15. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(3) 
Defendant failed to sustain burden of 
proving that appointed counsel's perform-
ance at trial deprived him of effective as-
sistance of counsel, absent showing that, 
but for alleged deficiencies of counsel, 
there was reasonable probability that jury 
would have decided differently. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr., Bugden, Collins & 
Keller, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen., 
Sandra J. Sjogren, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, GREENWOOD 
and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant was convicted of burglary, at-
tempted burglary, two counts of theft, and 
two counts of vehicle burglary. On appeal, 
defendant claims he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel in two respects: First, by the trial 
court's denial of his request for substitute 
counsel and, in that regard, by the court's 
failure to inquire adequately into the rea-
sons for defendant's dissatisfaction with 
appointed counsel, and second, in the pre-
sentation of his defense at trial. We af-
firm. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The facts relevant to this appeal are 
those relating to defendant's request for 
substitute counsel. Following arraign-
ment, Frances Palacios of the Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders Association was appointed 
to represent the defendant On the morn-
ing of the first day of trial, the defendant 
informed the court that he did not want to 
proceed with Ms. Palacios as his counsel 
because he did not "feel that she's done 
everything that she could in [his] case." 
The trial court asked the defendant to 
specify his reasons for thinking that coun-
sel had not represented his interests. De-
fendant reiterated his general complaint, 
mentioned that he had met with counsel 
only once, and complained that he had not 
received timely notification of a hearing 
scheduled on a motion to discover filed by 
Palacios. A lengthy exchange ensued con-
cerning the details of the discovery matter, 
from which it emerged that the prosecution 
agreed to provide the requested discovery 
and no hearing was ever held. The court 
did not delve further into defendant's earli-
er statement that he had met with counsel 
just once before trial. Nor did defendant 
provide any details on that subject during 
his remarks about his dissatisfaction with 
counsel. Defendant focused exclusively on 
the belated receipt of his copy of the dis-
covery notice. The court concluded that, 
consistent with her past performance, Ms. 
Palacios had done a good job in represent-
ing defendant's interests. The court de-
nied defendant's motion for substitute 
counsel. Defendant was subsequently 
tried before a jury and convicted on all 
counts. 
REQUEST FOR NEW COUNSEL 
[1,2] While an indigent defendant has a 
right to have counsel appointed to repre-
sent him, Gideon v. Wainvrright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344-45, 83 S.Ct 792, 796-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 
799 (1963), he does not have a constitution-
al right to a lawyer other than the one 
appointed, absent good cause. See, e.g., 
United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 
(5th Cir.1973). Whether to appoint a dif-
ferent lawyer for an indigent defendant 
who expresses dissatisfaction with his 
court-appointed counsel, but who has no 
constitutional right to appointment of a 
different attorney, is a matter committed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court 
and will be reversed only for an abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
It is suggested on this appeal that, had 
the trial court conducted a more extensive 
STATE v. PURSIFELL 
Cite as 746 Y2d 270 (UtahApp. 1987) 
Utah 273 
inquiry into the reasons for defendant's 
dissatisfaction, it would have uncovered a 
myriad of complaints about the quality of 
defendant's representation. Accordingly, 
we consider first the nature and extent of 
the court's inquiry and then turn to a con-
sideration of whether, in light of what the 
court learned, denial of the motion for sub-
stitute counsel violated the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, if 
not, whether it nonetheless constituted an 
abuse of discretion. 
A. Duty to Inquire 
[3] Typically, motions for substitute 
counsel are less likely to be granted when 
they would result in a significant delay or 
mistrial or would otherwise impede the 
prompt administration of justice. See 
Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 831 (9th 
Cir.1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 
S.Ct. 1896, 77 L.Ed.2d 285 (1983). Courts 
are also aware of the propensity for manip-
ulation of the process by criminal defend-
ants and some have cautioned that "re-
quests for appointment of a new attorney 
on the eve of trial should not become a 
vehicle for achieving delay." See United 
States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 717 (2d 
Cir.1967). 
We fully appreciate the possibility that 
defendants will fabricate complaints about 
counsel in an effort to promote delay or 
otherwise manipulate the system. 
Weighed against that realization, however, 
must be recognition of the inability of 
many indigent defendants, in view of their 
level of education and sophistication, to ad-
equately articulate their legitimate com-
plaints involving appointed counsel. There-
fore, when a complaint is registered by a 
criminal defendant concerning his or her 
appointed counsel, the court must balance 
the potential for last minute delay and the 
propensity for manipulation of the system 
against the competing concern about the 
likely inability of indigent defendants to 
articulate and communicate their dissatis-
faction in a setting which most laypersons 
find quite intimidating. 
1. As indicated, the trial court referred to its 
prior, positive experience with Ms. Palacios in 
rinding defendant's representation had been ad-
equate. A good overall reputation by counsel is 
[4,5] In establishing a standard of in-
quiry in the context of requests for substi-
tution of counsel, we decline to impose an 
affirmative duty on the trial court to rou-
tinely initiate its own inquiry, and thereby 
in effect solicit grievances from indigent 
defendants where no dissatisfaction has 
been expressed. Likewise, we decline de-
fendant's invitation to prescribe a checklist 
which trial courts must run through if any 
indicia of dissatisfaction should emerge. 
However, when dissatisfaction is ex-
pressed, the court must make some reason-
able, non-suggestive efforts to determine 
the nature of the defendant's complaints 
and to apprise itself of the facts necessary 
to determine whether the defendant's rela-
tionship with his or her appointed attorney 
has deteriorated to the point that sound 
discretion requires substitution or even to 
such an extent that his or her Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel would be violated but 
for substitution. Even when the trial 
judge suspects that the defendant's re-
quests are disingenuous and designed sole-
ly to manipulate the judicial process and to 
delay the trial, perfunctory questioning is 
not sufficient United States v. Welty, 674 
F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir.1982). 
[6] On the record before us, we cannot 
conclude that the quality of the trial court's 
inquiry did not meet this standard. De-
fendant expressed dissatisfaction with ap-
pointed counsel's representation. Appro-
priately, the court inquired about the "spe-
cific way" in which defendant's interests 
had not been represented. Defendant did 
mention he had met with counsel only once, 
but focused his remarks on the discovery 
matter. As a result, the court's follow-up 
questions of defendant and counsel were 
exclusively devoted to that matter. It 
clearly would have been preferable had the 
court inquired further into the other con-
cern alluded to by defendant, namely the 
extent of counsel's pretrial preparation.1 
Failure to do so, however, was not reversi-
no substitute for careful inquiry by the court 
since there is no guaranty even an excellent 
attorney, especially a very busy one, has not 
botched a particular case. 
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ble error in view of the emphasis defendant 
placed on his other concern and since a 
single, face-to-face meeting before trial is 
not, in itself, indicative of a lack of prepara-
tion in cases like the instant one.2 
B. No Constitutional Violation 
[7,8] Having determined that the 
court's inquiry into defendant's complaints 
was sufficient under the circumstances, we 
next consider whether the complaints them-
selves disclosed problems of a constitution-
al dimension. Of course, courts have no 
discretion to allow a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment. Substitution of counsel is 
mandatory when the defendant has demon-
strated good cause, such as a conflict of 
interest, a complete breakdown of commu-
nication, or an irreconcilable conflict with 
his or her attorney. United States v. Wei-
ty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir.1982); McKee 
v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.1981), 
cert denied, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct 1773, 
72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982). When a defendant 
is forced to stand trial "with the assistance 
of an attorney with whom he has become 
embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict," he 
is deprived of the "effective assistance of 
any counsel whatsoever" and his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is violated. 
Brown v. Craven, A2A F.2d 1166,1170 (9th 
Cir.1970). See United States v. Hart, 557 
F.2d 162, 163 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 434 
U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct 305, 54 L.EA2d 193 
(1977). 
In viewing defendant's remarks in a light 
most favorable to him, it is clear from the 
record that his dissatisfaction with appoint-
ed counsel was not so substantial as to rise 
to a constitutional level requiring the ap-
pointment of new counsel. 
[9] As indicated, we discern only one 
specific complaint registered by defendant 
in this case, i.e., that counsel was derelict 
in notifying defendant of a discovery mo-
tion, and arguably a complaint that defense 
2. The charges against defendant and the factual 
setting in which they arose would be a matter of 
routine for an experienced criminal defense at-
torney. Multiple interviews might have given 
defendant more of a sense that a committed 
advocate was diligently working on his behalf, 
counsel was inadequately prepared. While 
it is true that defendant did not receive 
notice of the discovery motion filed by de-
fense counsel until after a stipulation had 
been entered, the routine discovery motion 
required no input from defendant. Though 
the motion might have been subjectively 
important to defendant, "[g]ood cause for 
substitution of counsel cannot be deter-
mined 'solely according to the subjective 
standard of what the defendant per-
ceives.' " Thomas v. Wainwright, 767 
F.2d 738, 742 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting 
McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d at 932), cert 
denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1241, 89 
L.Ed.2d 349 (1986). 
[10,11] A serious lack of preparation 
might, in some circumstances, have such a 
disadvantageous effect on a defendant's 
representation as to rise to a constitutional 
violation. In this case, defendant conceded 
that he met with counsel on at least one 
occasion prior to trial. In view of the fairly 
routine nature of the underlying facts and 
offenses charged, and defense counsel's ex-
perience, the fact that counsel met with the 
defendant only once before trial is not nec-
essarily indicative of a lack of preparation. 
See Note 2, supra. Therefore, defendant's 
complaints did not warrant substitution of 
counsel as a matter of constitutional law.3 
C. No Abuse of Discretion 
[12,13] This determination, however, 
does not end our analysis. While a defend-
ant's complaints may not be of constitution-
al magnitude, denial of the motion may, 
under some circumstances, nonetheless 
constitute an abuse of discretion. As we 
have previously stated, however, defend-
ant's complaints in this case were insub-
stantial. While it might have been preferr-
able to delve deeper into defendant's argu-
able claim of inadequate preparation, the 
failure to do so was neither a constitutional 
violation nor an abuse of discretion. 
but would not necessarily have furthered his 
cause. 
3. Defendant's constitutional arguments are lim-
ited to the United States Constitution and we are 
not asked to consider whether the Utah Consti-
tution requires more. 
STATE v. PURSIFELL 
Cite as 746 P.2d 270 (UtahApp. 1987) 
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[14] Unsuccessful motions for substitu-
tion of counsel are typically followed by the 
claim that defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial. See, e.g., 
Thomas v. Wainivright, 767 F.2d 738 (11th 
Cir.1985); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826 
(9th Cir.1982). This case is no exception. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished the standard for determining claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 
To prevail, the defendant must demon-
strate, first, that counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reason-
able professional judgment, and second, 
that counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and 
interpreted the Strickland standard for de-
termining ineffective assistance claims. 
See, e.g., State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 
(Utah 1986). 
Under the first prong of the Strickland 
test, defendant must show that "specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent as-
sistance." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 
405. As we have previously stated, how-
ever, "this court will not second-guess trial 
counsel's legitimate use of judgment." 
Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1040 
(Utah CtApp.1987) (citing Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983)). 
See State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 205 
(Utah 1976). 
We need not consider whether defend-
ant's complaints4 were "sufficient to over-
come the strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised 
'reasonable professional judgment,' " State 
v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 (quoting Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 
S.Ct at 2066), because we are able to de-
cide this case solely on the second prong of 
the Strickland test. We need not decide 
whether counsel's performance was defi-
4. Specifically, defendant claims counsel was de-
ficient in (1) failing to challenge the propriety of 
defendant's initial detention; (2) failing to chal-
lenge the unnecessarily suggestive identification 
cient if defendant fails to satisfy his bur-
den of showing that he was prejudiced as a 
result of the alleged deficiencies. Id. 
"The object of an ineffectiveness claim is 
not to grade counsel's performance. If it 
is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, . . . that course should be fol-
lowed." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct at 2069. 
[15] Pointing to little more than his con-
viction, defendant has suggested on appeal 
that he was prejudiced as a result of coun-
sel's performance. However, "an unfavor-
able result does not compel a conclusion of 
ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. In demonstrating 
prejudice, it is not enough to show that the 
alleged errors "had some conceivable effect 
on the outcome" of the trial but, rather, , 
defendant must show that a " 'reasonable 
probability exists' that, but for counsel's 
error, the result would have been differ-
ent." Id. "Reasonable probability" is de-
fined as "that sufficient to undermine con-
fidence in the reliability of the verdict." 
Id. See also State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1985); State v. Lenzing, 688 P.2d 
492 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant has failed to show that but 
for the alleged deficiencies of counsel there 
is a reasonable probability that the jury 
would have decided differently. Accord-
ingly, his convictions are affirmed. 
DAVIDSON and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
(O f«YNUMK*SVSTIM> 
procedure; and (3) in failing to impeach the 
identification testimony of a witness with a pri-
or inconsistent statement. 
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lating to the business operation which gave 
rise to charges of theft by deception consti-
tuted admissions by the defendant concern-
ing his criminal intent, and were admissible 
under the admissions of a party exception 
to the hearsay rule; thus they were not 
subject to the foundation requirements of 
rule admitting hearsay statements of cocon-
spirators made in the course of a conspir-
acy. Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(7, 9). 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Third District court, Salt Lake County, Er-
nest F. Baldwin, J., of th^ft by deception, 
and he appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that: (1) testimony by 
witnesses as to their conversations with de-
fendant in another state relating to a plan 
for a business operation, were admissible as 
such plans constituted an early step in the 
effectuation of the criminal scheme that 
was consummated in Utah, and admissibili-
ty of such testimony was therefore not gov-
erned by rule prohibiting admission of prior 
acts; (2) evidence of operation of fruit juice 
business by defendant in another state was 
admissible to establish defendant's intent 
and modus operandi in prosecution for simi-
lar business activities in Utah, as the simi-
larity of the two operations, their proximity 
in time, and their peculiarity served to es-
tablish defendant's intent and knowledge 
regarding the illegal nature of the opera-
tion; and (3) evidence demonstrated that 
the defendant exercised control over inves-
tors' property and created a false impres-
sion that machines, when paid for, would be 
ordered and delivered, and knowingly prom-
ised performance which he did not intend to 
deliver. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>406(7) 
Testimony by witnesses as to conversa-
tions between themselves and defendant re-
2. Criminal Law <s=> 1036.5, 1044.1(5) 
Where defendant did not object or 
move to strike as hearsay testimony by 
witnesses as to statements attributed to 
third parties, he could not raise the issue on 
appeal. 
3. Criminal Law <£=>374 
Evidence of prior acts of a defendant, 
admissible when relevant to prove some 
other material fact than his disposition to 
commit crime, such as motive or intent, is 
subject to a determination by the trial 
judge that its probative value is not out-
weighed by the possibility of undue preju-
dice. Rules of Evidence, Rule 55. 
4. Criminal Law <s=>369.2(6) 
Testimony by witnesses as t * their con-
versations with defendant in Arizona relat-
ing to a plan for a business operation in 
Utah which subsequently gave rise to 
charges of theft by deception, was admissi-
ble, as such plans constituted an early step 
in the effectuation of the criminal scheme 
that was consummated in Utah, and admis-
sibility of such testimony was therefore not 
governed by rule prohibiting admission of 
prior acts. Rules of Evidence, Rule 55. 
5. Criminal Law <s=>370, 371(1) 
Evidence of operation of Arizona fruit 
juice business by defendant was admissible 
to establish defendant's intent and modus 
operandi in prosecution for similar business 
activities in Utah, as the similarity of the 
two operations, their proximity in time, and 
their peculiarity served to establish defend-
ant's intent and knowledge regarding the 
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illegal nature of the operation. Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 55. 
6. Criminal Law <s=>371(l), 372(1) 
Evidence of a defendant's prior acts, 
admissible to establish defendant's intent 
and modus operandi, need not necessarily 
rise to the level of a criminal offense. 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 55. 
7. Criminal Law <s=> 1038.2, 1038.3 
Failure of defendant to request a jury 
instruction or object to the lack of an in-
struction that evidence of prior bad acts 
must be shown by clear and convincing 
proof precluded the issue from considera-
tion on appeal. Rules of Evidence, Rule 55. 
8. Criminal Law <3=>507(1) 
An "accomplice" is one who is also 
criminally liable for the conduct charged. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-2-202. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
9. Criminal Law <s»507(l) 
Mere presence, or even prior knowl-
edge, does not make one an accomplice 
when he neither advises, instigates, encour-
ages, or assists in perpetration of the crime. 
U.C.A.1953, 7&-2-202. 
10. Criminal Law <3=»59(1) 
Even if one has lent aid and encourage-
ment, voluntary abandonment of his partic-
ipation prior to the commission of the crime 
relieves him of criminal liability for its com-
mission, providing the abandonment was 
communicated to the remaining parties and 
occurred prior to a time when the crime had 
become so inevitable that its commission 
could not reasonably be stayed. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-2-202. 
11. Criminal Law <s=>507(l) 
Prosecution witness, who took part in 
early discussions with defendant relating to 
planned business operation which gave rise 
to charges of theft by deception, was not an 
"accomplice" in the crime for which defend-
ant was charged and convicted, as the rec-
ord indicated that witness* decision to aban-
don all involvement in the illegal activity 
was made and communicated long before 
the commission of the crime; thus corrobo-
ration of his testimony by other evidence 
was not required. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-202, 
77-31-18. 
12. Criminal Law <s=>511.1(6) 
Where first witness corroborated testi-
mony of accomplice that defendant was in-
volved in the planning of a vending ma-
chine scheme, second witness described how 
defendant paid her and two others to sign 
incorporation papers to avoid having the 
names of the real owners made public, and 
employees of the business testified as to 
defendant's involvement with the business 
operation, the accomplice's testimony was 
sufficiently corroborated to support defend-
ant's conviction. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-202, 77-
31-18. 
13. Crimina] Law G=>5U2 
Although corroborating evidence suffi-
cient to support a defendant's conviction 
need not go to all the material facts as 
testified to by the accomplice, nor need it be 
sufficient in itself to support a conviction, 
the corroborating evidence must connect 
the defendant with the commission of the 
offense and be consistent with his guilt and 
inconsistent with his innocence. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-31-18. 
14. Embezzlement <s=>52 
Where defendant's conduct did not stop 
at merely offering to sell property with an 
intent not to deliver it or delivering to a 
customer a lesser quantity or commodity or 
service, but also involved taking money 
from investors for the purchase of fruit 
juice vending machines and exercising con-
trol over that money with a crimina) intent 
to permanently deprive them of it and not 
deliver a machine at all, his conduct clearly 
constituted a theft offense and not merely a 
deceptive business practice, and therefore 
rule requiring a lesser punishment where 
STATE v. 
Cite as, Utah, 
there is doubt as to the applicable statute 
was not applicable. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-405, 
76-6-507. 
15. Criminal Law e=> 1144.13(2), 1159.2(7) 
It is the defendant's burden on appeal 
to establish that the evidence was so incon-
clusive or insubstantial that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime charged, and Supreme Court will re-
view the evidence and all inferences which 
may be reasonably drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. 
16. Embezzlement <s=>44(l) 
Evidence in prosecution for theft by 
deception, including fact that defendant re-
ceived over $25,000 from investors who did 
not receive the machines for which payment 
was made, demonstrated that the defendant 
exercised control over investors' property 
and created a false impression that ma-
chines, when paid for, would be ordered and 
delivered, and knowingly promised per-
formance which he did not intend to deliv-
er, and supported guilty verdict. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-6-405. 
17. Embezzlement <®=»26 
In light of facts that Criminal Code 
provides that the offense denominated 
"theft" embraces the separate offenses pre-
viously known as larceny, embezzlement, 
false pretenses, and others, and that there 
was substantial evidence of theft by decep-
tion, was not improperly charged with theft 
by deception rather than theft by embezzle-
ment. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-403, 76-6-405. 
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., of Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Robert R. 
Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
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STEWART, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from his conviction by 
a jury of eleven counts of theft by decep-
tion in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-405.1 We 
affirm. 
There was sufficient evidence to justify 
the jury in believing the following: In 1976 
defendant became involved with Rex Par-
sons and certain other persons in planning a 
scheme to sell vending machines. The price 
was to be paid in advance, but, except for 
some early deliveries to give the appearance 
of a legitimate business, the machines 
would not actually be delivered to investors. 
Such a scheme was established in Arizona, 
and subsequently a business enterprise 
known as Fruit Juice, Inc., and Fruit Juice 
of Salt Lake was incorporated in Utah. 
The business used a phone solicitation ap-
proach to find people willing to invest mon-
ey to purchase and place one or more fruit 
juice vending machines that would yield a 
monthly profit. Employees were hired by 
defendant and others to make the calls and 
to follow up by meeting with interested 
persons. Office managers ran the day-to-
day operation of the business. Defendant 
commuted from Arizona and spent one or 
two days a week at the Salt Lake City 
business offices. 
Vending machines were sold and deliv-
ered to some investors. A number of peo-
ple, however, signed contracts and paid for 
the machines but did not receive them. 
Eleven of these persons were complaining 
witnesses named in the information. They 
testified that when they became concerned 
about the business' failure to deliver their 
machines, they unsuccessfully tried to con-
tact Fruit Juice, Inc., and eventually be-
came aware that it was no longer conduct-
ing business. In fact, the office was closed 
down and business ceased in August 1977. 
Defendant was charged with and convicted 
of theft by deception. 
Defendant asserts in the alternative that 
his conviction should be reversed, that he 
1. AH statutory references are to Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), as amended. 
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should be granted a new trial, or that he 
should be sentenced pursuant to the lesser 
violation of fraudulent business practices, 
§ 76-6-507. He relies on the following four 
contentions: (1) testimony of co-conspira-
tors was erroneously admitted; (2) testimo-
ny of accomplices was not corroborated; (3) 
defendant's punishment should have been 
based on § 76-6-507 because it is more spe-
cific regarding the illegal conduct alleged 
and has a lesser penalty than theft by de-
ception; and (4) the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the jury's verdict. 
We consider first defendant's challenge 
to the admission of the testimony of Rex 
Parsons and Howard Woodall, who are 
characterized as co-conspirators. Their tes-
timony supported the State's characteriza-
tion of Fruit Juice, Inc., as a front for a 
scheme to obtain money from investors and 
then leave town without delivering the 
promised machines. Parsons testified that 
he was the person who presented to defend-
ant the idea to set up the scheme in Arizo-
na, and later Parsons and defendant came 
to Salt Lake City to establish a similar 
operation. Woodall testified that he took 
part in some of the initial conversations in 
Arizona about the plan, but that he discon-
tinued his contact with the defendant and 
Parsons and had no part in the subsequent 
operation, either in Arizona or Utah. Woo-
dall's testimony as to his noninvolvement 
was uncontradicted. 
Defendant contends that the damaging 
statements contained in the testimony of 
these two men, whom be characterizes as 
co-conspirators, lacked proper foundation 
and were inadmissible hearsay statements. 
Rule 63(9)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, enti-
tled "Vicarious Admissions," allows the ad-
mission of hearsay statements of co-conspir-
ators made in the course of a conspiracy.2 
Defendant properly asserts that the admis-
sibility of hearsay statements of co-conspir-
2. That rule provides for the admissibility of, 
[a]s against a party, a statement which 
would be admissible if made by the declarant 
at the hearing if * * * (b) the party and the 
declarant were participating in a plan to 
ators falling within this exception must be 
predicated upon independent evidence of 
the existence of the conspiracy, apart from 
co-conspirator hearsay declarations. State 
v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). 
[1] Defendant has, however, improperly 
characterized the nature of the challenged 
testimony, and his objection to its admissi-
bility is without merit. Parsons and Woo-
dall testified primarily to statements consti-
tuting admissions by the defendant con-
cerning his criminal intent. Out-of-court 
statements of a party are not subject to the 
foundational requirements of Rule 63(9) but 
are admissible pursuant to Rule 63(7), which 
embodies the age-old common law excep-
tion to the hearsay rule known as an admis-
sion of a party. 
[2] Defendant concedes the admissibili-
ty of testimony by the witnesses as to what 
they themselves did or said and as to what 
the defendant did or said. But defendant 
contends that the testimony of Parsons and 
Woodall was "tainted" when placed in con-
text with testimony as to what persons 
other than the defendant or the witnesses 
were doing or saying during the course of 
the alleged conspiracy. Defendant has not, 
however, cited any objectionable testimony 
by Parsons or Woodall as to third-party 
out-of-court statements. The only state-
ments attributed to third parties were vol-
unteered by the witnesses, and no valid 
objection or motion to strike was made in 
response to them. These included out-of-
court statements allegedly made by Bill 
Wilson, who had been involved in a similar 
scheme in Colorado, and an attorney named 
Dick Berry, who advised the group on incor-
poration requirements. These statements 
were made not to Utah investors but only 
within the small group of original organiz-
ers. In the absence of a valid objection or 
motion to strike, the admissibility of hear-
say may not be raised on appeal. 
commit a crime or a civil wrong and the 
statement was relevant to the plan or its 
subject matter and was made while the plan 
was in existence and before its complete exe-
cution or other termination 
STATE v. 
Citeas, UUih, 
[3] Defendant further contends that the 
testimony of Parsons and Woodall regard-
ing activities that took place in Arizona was 
inadmissible under Rule 55 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence.3 That rule proscribes 
evidence of another crime or civil wrong 
unless it is relevant to prove certain materi-
al facts, such as motive, intent, plan, or 
knowledge. State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 
P.2d 880 (1978). Evidence of prior acts 
admissible under Rule 55 is also subject to a 
determination by the trial judge that its 
probative value is not outweighed by the 
possibility of undue prejudice. State v. 
Gibson, Utah, 565 P.2d 783 (1977). 
It is the sound policy of the law that 
evidence of prior crimes may not be admit' 
ted to show the propensity of a defendant 
to commit another crime. But in situations 
where evidence of other crimes or wrongs is 
particularly relevant in proving a specific 
element of the crime for which the defend' 
ant is on trial, the evidence may be allowed 
for that purpose. See State v. Lopez, 22 
Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 880 (1978), State v. 
Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961). 
[4] As to the testimony regarding plan' 
ning meetings which took place in Arizona, 
defendant's argument based on Rule 55 
misses the mark. The testimony of Parsons 
and Woodall concerning discussions and 
meetings in Arizona related directly to the 
plan for the Salt Lake City operation, which 
itself gave rise to the criminal charges 
against defendant This evidence is not 
governed by Rule 55 because it constituted 
an early step in the effectuation of the 
criminal scheme that was consummated in 
Salt Lake City. 
3. Rule 55 provides: 
Other Crimes or Civil Wrongs. Subject to 
Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a 
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, 
is inadmissible to prove his disposition to 
commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for 
an inference that he committed another 
crime or civil wrong on another specified 
occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, 
such evidence is admissible when relevant to 
prove some other material fact including ab-
sence of mistake or accident, motive, oppor-
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[5] Defendant also argues that evidence 
of the actual operation of the Arizona fruit 
juice business was subject to Rule 55 and 
that the State did not establish the required 
foundation for its admissibility. However, 
Parsons testified that he and the defendant 
were among those who intended to "take 
the money and run" once the business be-
came established. They sold and delivered 
some machines to investors, but failed to 
deliver machines to others and kept the 
purchase price. The Arizona scheme was 
terminated when an associate absconded 
with the funds collected. 
[6] Evidence of defendant's prior acts 
similar to those charged in this case was 
admissible to establish defendant's intent 
and modus operandi. Such evidence need 
not necessarily rise to the level of a criminal 
offense. United States v. Simmons, 503 
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1974). 
The similarity of the Arizona scheme arvd 
the Salt Lake City activities, their proximi-
ty in time, and their peculiarity serve to 
establish defendant's intent and knowledge 
regarding the illegal nature of the opera-
tion. Therefore, this evidence was admissi-
ble under Rule 55. Cf. Weeks v. United 
States, 313 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1963). 
[7] Defendant further asserts that as a 
prerequisite to the admission of evidence of 
prior wrongdoing for any permissible pur-
pose, it is necessary to show by clear and 
convincing proof the illegality of the prior 
act.4 We do not find it necessary in this 
case to reach the issue of the burden of 
proof regarding evidence of prior wrongdo-
tunity intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
identity. 
4. For this assertion defendant relies on two 
federal cases, United States v. Broadway, 477 
F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973), and United States v. 
Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977). But 
these cases were overruled by United States v. 
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), on the 
ground that they were incompatible with Rule 
404(b), Federal Rules of Evidence, which deals 
with the admissibility of evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts. Rule 404(b) provides: 
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ing. No instruction on the burden of proof 
was submitted by defendant and none was 
given to the jury. Defendant's failure to 
request a jury instruction or object to the 
lack of an instruction that evidence of prior 
bad acts must be shown by clear and con-
vincing proof precludes the issue from con-
sideration on appeal. 
Defendant also contends that the testimo-
ny of Parsons and Woodall was accomplice 
testimony that was not corroborated as re-
quired by § 77-31-18, which, though later 
amended, was applicable to the present of-
fense. Section 77-31-18 provided: 
A conviction shall not be had on the testi-
mony of an accomplice, unless he is cor-
roborated by other evidence, which in it-
self and without the aid of the testimony 
of the accomplice tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the 
offense; and the corroboration shall not 
be sufficient, if it merely shows the com-
mission of the offense or the circumstanc-
es thereof. 
[8-11] An accomplice, as defined by 
§ 76-2-202,5 is one who is also criminally 
liable for the conduct charged. State v. 
Berg, Utah, 613 P.2d 1125 (1980); State v. 
Cornish, Utah, 560 P.2d 1134 (1977). Mere 
presence, or even prior knowledge, does not 
make one an accomplice when he neither 
advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in 
perpetration of the crime. State v. Gee, 28 
Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972). Neverthe-
less, even if one has lent aid and encourage-
ment, voluntary abandonment of his partic-
ipation prior to the commission of the crime 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.—Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admis-
sible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent. 
The later Beechum case held that the rule 
called for a two-step test: first, it must be 
determined that the evidence is relevant to an 
issue other than the defendant's character, and 
second, that the evidence possesses probative 
value that is not substantially outweighed by 
relieves him of criminal liability for its com-
mission providing the abandonment was 
communicated to the remaining parties and 
occurred prior to a time when the crime had 
become so inevitable that its commission 
could not reasonably be stayed. Harrison v. 
State, Ind., 382 N.E.2d 920 (1978); People v. 
Rybkz, 16 IlL2d 394, 158 N.E.2d 17 (1959); 
Hendtick v. State, 229 Ind. 381, 98 N.E.2d 
906 (1951); State v. Peterson, Minn., 4 
N.W.2d 826 (1942). On these principles, 
Woodall was not an accomplice. Although 
Woodall took part in early discussions in 
Arizona, the record indicates that his deci-
sion to abandon all involvement in the ille-
gal activity was made and communicated 
long before the commission of the crime for 
which defendant was charged. Woodall 
therefore could not be said to be an accom-
plice in the crime for which defendant was 
herein charged and convicted. 
[12] The State concedes Parsons' status 
as an accomplice. Parsons' testimony, how-
ever, was without question sufficiently cor-
roborated to support defendant's conviction. 
Woodall corroborated the testimony that 
defendant was involved in the planning of 
the vending machine scheme. A Dorothy 
Pulley described how defendant paid her 
and two others to sign the incorporation 
papers to avoid having the names of the 
real owners made public. Employees of the 
business testified as to defendant's involve-
ment with the Salt Lake City operation. 
The business records indicated the receipt 
of large amounts of moneys from the busi-
ness by both defendant and Parsons. 
undue prejudice. However, Beechum did not 
require that the illegality of prior wrongs be 
shown by clear and convincing proof. 
5. Section 76-2-202 provides as follows: 
Criminal responsibility for direct commis-
sion of offense or for conduct of another.— 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solic-
its, requests, commands, encourages, or in-
tentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct 
STATE v. 
Cite as, Utah, 
[13] This Court has previously stated 
that the corroboration need not go to all the 
material facts as testified to by the accom-
plice, nor need it be sufficient in itself to 
support a conviction. However, the corrob-
orating evidence must connect the defend-
ant with the commission of the offense and 
be consistent with his guilt and inconsistent 
with his innocence. See State v. Christean, 
Utah, 533 P.2d 872 (1975); State v. Vigil, 
123 Utah 495, 498, 260 P.2d 539, 541 (1953); 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 ?2d 285 
(1941). Based on these standards, Parsons' 
testimony was sufficiently corroborated. 
Another contention made by defendant is 
that he should have been punished pursuant 
to the provisions of § 76-6-507, which pro-
scribes deceptive business practices, because 
it is more specific regarding the illegal con-
duct for which defendant was convicted and 
has a lesser penalty than theft by deception. 
Defendant argues that where there are two 
statutes which proscribe the same conduct, 
and one is more specific with regard to the 
allegations charged than the other, it is 
necessary that a defendant be prosecuted 
under the more specific statute. Also, if 
two statutes proscribe the same conduct 
and one statute has a lesser penalty than 
the other, the defendant may only be pun-
ished to the extent of the lesser penalty. 
Defendant cites State v. Shondell, 22 
Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1965), which 
involved an analysis of the drug abuse con-
trol law and the Narcotics Drug Act, both 
enacted during the same session of the 1967 
Legislature. Shondell had been charged 
with possession of the drug LSD, a misde-
meanor under the drug abuse control law 
and a felony under the terms of the Narcot-
ic Drug Act. This Court held that the 
clear, specific, and lesser penalty prescribed 
for the offense of possession of LSD was 
applicable, rather than the more severe pen-
alty provided by overlapping provisions of 
the Narcotic Drug Act. The Court in Shon-
6. We do not, of course, mean to say that any 
businessman who fails to deliver merchandise 
or services according to a contract is guilty of 
theft by deception. A theft conviction requires 
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dell based its decision on the rule "that 
where there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
which of two punishments is applicable to 
an offense an accused is entitled to the 
benefit of the lesser." 
[14] Application of the Shondell stan-
dard, requiring a lesser punishment when 
there is doubt as to the applicable statute, is 
not appropriate in the present case. Read-
ing the theft and deceptive business prac-
tice statutes, there is no doubt or uncertain-
ty as to which of the two statutes is appli-
cable to the facts of this case. 
The crimes described in § 76-6-507 are 
distinguishable from the crime of theft by 
deception as committed by the defendant. 
The deceptive business practices defined as 
criminal include using or possessing for use 
a false weight or measure; selling or deliv-
ering less than the represented quantity or 
quality of a commodity or service; making 
a false or misleading statement in an adver-
tisement addressed to the public; offering, 
by advertising or other means of communi-
cation to the public, property or services 
with intent not to sell or provide the adver-
tised property or services at the offered 
price or in a sufficient quantity or at all; or 
other acts not relevant here. 
Defendant has not specified which sub-
section of the deceptive business practice 
statute he relies upon in seeking the imposi-
tion of a lesser penalty, and we are unper-
suaded that any of the conduct proscribed 
therein is the equivalent of the charges for 
which defendant was convicted. Defend-
ant's conduct did not stop at merely offer-
ing to sell property with an intent not to 
deliver it or delivering to a customer a 
lesser quantity of a commodity or service. 
He took money from investors for the pur-
chase of fruit juice vending machines and 
exercised control over that money with the 
criminal intent to permanently deprive 
them of it and not deliver a machine at all. 
This conduct clearly constitutes a theft of-
fense and not merely a deceptive business 
practice.6 
proof of the intent to illegally and permanently 
deprive one of his property, not merely of a 
breach of the terms of a business agreement. 
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[15] Defendant's final contention is that 
the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
conviction. It is defendant's burden to es-
tablish that the evidence was so inconclu-
sive or insubstantial that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime 
charged. State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 
880 (1978). This Court will review the evi-
dence and all inferences which may be rea-
sonably drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. Id. 
[16] Defendant contends that the State 
did not show that defendant exercised con-
trol over anybody's property or that he cre-
ated or confirmed an impression of fact 
that was false. We find, to the contrary, 
that the record amply supports the jury 
verdict in this case. The defendant re-
ceived over $25,000 paid directly to him or 
to his wife for one day's work a week over a 
period of a few months. This money came 
irom investors w\io did not receive t\ie ma-
chines for which payment was made. De-
fendant's participation in the business had 
substantial support in the record. Defend-
ant paid three persons not otherwise con-
nected with the business to sign the incor-
poration papers. He also hired employees, 
participated in setting up the Salt Lake 
City office, directed employees, held sales 
meetings, controlled the finances and 
signed checks, and authorized payment for 
machines. He was not under the supervi-
sion of any other business associates. The 
evidence clearly showed that defendant's 
plan was knowingly to create a false im-
pression that machines, when paid for, 
would be ordered and delivered, and know-
ingly, to promise performance which he did 
not intend to deliver. 
\YJ] Finally, defendant's contention that 
the State should have charged theft by 
embezzlement rather than theft by decep-
tion is without merit. Section 76-6-403 of 
the Utah Criminal Code enacted in 1973 
provides that the offense denominated 
"theft'' embraces the separate offenses pre-
viously known as larceny, embezzlement, 
false pretense, and others not relevant here. 
The vgrdict of theft by deception on eleven 
counts finds substantial support in the rec-
ord. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKlNS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
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